Investment banks: too big to shrink
Austerity and investment banking are not words that often appear in the same sentence. So many investment banks have found the enforced restraint of the past few years something of a struggle. Everything has been cut back, from bonuses, staff and expense accounts, to risk-taking, proprietary trading and leverage.Everything that is, except balance sheets. Investment banks are supposed to be reining themselves in under the combined pressure of the slowdown in financial markets and regulatory reform. You would therefore expect balance sheets to be shrinking.
But instead, over the three years to
the end of June, the balance sheets at a sample of nine large
comparable investment banks increased by 6% in dollar terms when
measured by total assets, according to my analysis (see chart).
That may not seem like a huge
increase. But, over the same period, revenues across the industry have
fallen by around one third and pre-tax profits by closer to two thirds.
Logic would suggest that investment
banks should be frantically dumping assets overboard like the crew of a
sinking ship, not taking on more cargo. Do too many banks have a
misguided faith in their own ability to ride out the storm better than
their rivals? If so, it raises the fear that they have merely postponed a
painful process of deleverage and shrinking.
Feeling bloated
Of the nine banks, only UBS
Investment Bank and the markets division at Bank of America Merrill
Lynch reduced the size of their balance sheets over the past three
years. The securities and banking division at Citi has ramped up its
assets by nearly one fifth over the past three years and the investment
bank at JP Morgan has increased its balance sheet by around 12%, while
the investment banks at Barclays, Deutsche Bank and Credit Suisse (yes,
Credit Suisse) are just behind.
In the past year, the growth has
been even more remarkable at some firms. Reported total assets in the
investment banking arms at Barclays and Deutsche Bank have risen by more
than 10% in dollar terms (but they are up by much more in local
currency over the past year). With profits falling, return on assets – a
simple measure of how much money you make on the stuff you throw at the
wall – has collapsed at most firms.
So what is going on? First, it is
important to note that balance sheets have shrunk from their pre-crisis
peaks at many banks by between one quarter and one third. This has also
been accompanied by an increase in equity, so overall leverage in the
industry has fallen.
Second, there are lots of reasons
why the balance sheets of investment banks might be growing – or, at
least, not shrinking. You might expect balance sheets to grow at those
banks that are more confident they can take advantage of the current
dislocation in the market to grab market share. This would explain some
of the growth at JP Morgan, Barclays, and perhaps Deutsche Bank.
More recently, after years of
stumbling through the financial crisis, Citi has set out to expand its
business in markets where other banks are on the back foot, such as
European credit. A big push in corporate banking at firms like JP Morgan
and Bank of America Merrill Lynch, with greater willingness to put
their balance sheets on the line for clients, might also explain some of
the growth.
You might also expect the overall
upswing in asset values, the revaluing of derivatives holdings and
changes to accounting rules to be responsible for some of the increase.
For European banks in particular, access to virtually free money and the
opportunity to gorge themselves on supposedly risk-free government
bonds might prove irresistible.
Hung, drawn and quartered?
But these explanations don’t account
for the apparent contradiction of ever-expanding balance sheets and an
industry that would have you believe it is being hung, drawn and
quartered by regulators and politicians. One banks analyst said he was
“confused” that balance sheets had not shrunk in line with the pressure
on the industry.
A clue to this resistance can be
found when you look at the relationship between total assets and their
somewhat more nebulous cousins, risk-weighted assets. One of the
fundamental flaws of the new regulatory world is that it leaves banks
with an enormous degree of leeway to calculate their own risk-weighted
assets, the denominator in calculating how much equity investment banks
must set aside against their business.
In allowing them to calculate the
risk-weighting of many of their assets using their own models, banks
have a clear conflict and incentive to understate the risk in their
balance sheets. Lower RWAs equals lower equity, which equals higher
leverage and higher profitability.
This disconnect becomes clear when
you look at what has happened to RWAs and total assets, which have
either fallen slightly or actually risen. In other words, through some
strange alchemy, investment banks have been able to reduce the riskier
stuff on their balance sheets that would otherwise reduce their leverage
and profitability, while managing to increase the size of their total
assets at the same time.
At Deutsche Bank’s corporate banking
and securities business, total reported assets increased by 3% in the
first half of this year while RWAs fell by 3%. At Credit Suisse, assets
fell by just 1%, but RWAs dropped by 9%. It is a similar story at
Barclays and Goldman Sachs.
This could be simply a case of
replacing riskier assets such as securitisations with larger amounts of
less risky and lower-return stuff like government bonds and cash. It’s
also a question of banks focusing on the urgent priority of bringing
down their RWAs, before turning to the rest of the balance sheet.
But it could hint at something
murkier: instead of taking on board the message from the past few years
that they need to get in shape, many investment banks – like
midnight-snacking dieters – are jumping through hoops to persuade
regulators and investors that they are shrinking, while their overall
girth quietly expands.
Sooner rather than later, they might just burst.