Europe's economy.

6. Creating a new post-Soviet space, "nerossiyskoy" infrastructure of energy supplies in the EU Of the EU's strategy to diversify energy imports implies, as mentioned above, the strategy of containment of Russia in the post-Soviet space, to avoid direct or indirect control on the part of the mining sector and transit infrastructure and adjacent areas. In parallel, the "containment", the EU is building a new regional alliances. Significant in this regard, the role of Ukraine, which, apparently intended to turn the country "cordon sanitaire", which creates transaction costs for Russia "on the way" in Europe, an active mediator "nerossiyskih" energy supplies. Draft multi-gas transport consortium (Russia-Ukraine-Germany), and failed, but following the visit of Yushchenko in Germany, Deutsche Bank offers "Naftogaz Ukraine" a credit line worth about 2 billion euros for the implementation of international projects of the company. Ukraine becomes the EU's trusted "gas operator" on the post-Soviet space. For a start, it will sell Turkmen gas, together with Poland and Germany. Anticipated the imminent establishment of trading houses for sale on the territory of the European Union "gas nerossiyskogo origin", which can be a source of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, dissatisfied with re-export monopoly Gazprom, which controls transit routes. Today, the EU believes that this transport problem is feasible, as evidenced by the start of new projects, including gas pipeline, the Caspian and Caucasus. As for their implementation, Russia's control over the transit gas from Central Asia and the Caspian basin to Europe, will be eliminated or minimized. However, experts note that the main factor energopoliticheskogo influence on post-Soviet Russia is not the activity of external forces, and its own system the choice between a model of European energy space and a common energy space in the format Russia - Kazakhstan - Belarus. In the event of a priority focus on "a European" model, Russia loses not only the influence of the former Soviet Union, and leverage themselves panregionalnoy bloc politics (which is exacerbated by a factor of entry into the WTO, narrowing tools of regional economic unions). The common denominator of the above challenges is the consolidated claim the Euro-Atlantic world: Russia's energy potential should not be a factor in its political sovereignty. We do not assume the axiom of manifest hostility of the European and Euro-Atlantic structures in relation to Russia. Rather, this requirement is a consequence of the notorious "doomed to cooperation", which is often said Westernizing elite in Russia. The question, as was said - in determining the conditions of the alliance forced the EU and Russia. In the absence of strategic applications for subjectivity on the part of Russia, the alliance would be colonization, as listed, and provides insights into the vectors pressure. An indicator of "colonial" European integration project for Russia is not the formal status of Russia in the negotiation process, and the host of the elite model of development. One can predict that further "deep integration" in a given line is vital to both sides of modernization of Russia's transit infrastructure will be paid partly vnutrirossiyskim consumer (due to the gradual equalization rates to the level of "European" market), in part - by foreign investors in exchange for access to Russia's oil fields. As a result, on the one hand, the shortage will worsen the gap between the commodity sector and the manufacturing industry, on the other - would be excluded even a formal opportunity to address this gap through mobilization of resources for fuel and energy infrastructure and industrial projects of national importance. In this context, experts noted that the requirement of "internationalization" of the mining industry and the liberalization of domestic gas prices - important to our partners not only as a factor of competitive advantage, but as a systemic factor in deterring domestic consumption in Russia. The suppression of energy-intensive industrial growth in Russia - a natural imperative for Europe's energy security and an integral part of the philosophy of the common European home, in which Russia belongs to the role stokehold. Kochegarka powerful, but too cumbersome to spend resources to "heating" of all its excess space (hence, in particular, and the requirement of non-development of Siberia and the transition to the shift method of mining). Thus, embedding in energopolitichesky format "big Europe" suggests the possibility for Russia to obtain raw materials rents, but obviously it impossible for certain types of investments: in the industrial growth, energy-intensive development of the regions, the expansion in prirubezhnyh zones. As the main advantage of this model of dependent development is called, as a rule, high level of security: Europe is interested in the integrity and stability of energy supplier for all of it "during transit. However, the integrity of the transit corridors is not identical to the integrity of the society and country. On the contrary, the project evrozavisimogo development means loss of connectivity to Russia - Social (priority foreign markets over domestic distinguishes outward oriented "growth points" of a degrading social landscape) and territorial (regional integration of heterogeneous Russia in the European space "is destined to be" different rates "). In the limit, logistics of supply does not prevent vzaimoizolyatsiya regional societies, as well as the integrity of pipeline routes does not preclude the "cutting" Trans-Siberian railway route. Fragmented Russia around a single system of pipes - this is the only possible model of the eastern wing of the "big Europe". This image corresponds to the low standard of European modernization. Moreover, it is the "European choice" (understood as the course "European integration" on its system conditions) makes Russia a country with high quality non-European level and type of development. This statement is paradoxical only at first glance. Some theorists "Wider Europe", indicating that outside the European core (where are those limits - theme of a separate debate), the principle of integration is not the similarities and differences in the level of economic development, ensuring their complementarity. Price "European choice" in the energy sphere, as we see, is very high: loss of energopoliticheskogo sovereignty, preservation of the commodity model and the fragmentation of the country. The problem is that at least as great today is the willingness of the ruling elite to pay that price. According to expert estimates, expressed at the seminar, during the last years of the second legislative term, Putin significantly grows the likelihood of far-reaching concessions on many painful for our country's issues. Including, for energy sovereignty. Part of the President's, and increasingly, representatives of the north-western elite, seem to see themselves as part of the internationalized corporate infrastructure control energy flows Russia - the EU and, consequently, act as lobbyists of its internationalization. On the other hand, a package of energy requirements may well be played as the price of legitimizing the new government in the West orange revolution scenario. And these two lines of the threat does not exclude, but rather complement each other. Moreover, the draft energy desuverenizatsii Russia under the auspices of European integration could eventually become the main point of consensus okolovlastnogo and orange segments serving the elite. That is a key to soft transit authorities with security guarantees (formula life + property) for some and guarantees the legitimacy for others. Therefore, it is essential that the change of power in Russia, first of all, do not require additional legitimacy from the outside, that is passed through the most democratic scenario, and, secondly, to withdraw to the forefront of free evrozavisimosti social-patriotic elite.